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I Introduction
In summer 2007, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC), the highest court re-
viewing asylum decisions of the Swiss administration, had to decide on two unrelated
appeals of rejected asylum seekers from Afghanistan. Both appellants were male, of Haz-
ara ethnicity, Shiite Muslims from Kabul and with family still living there. On July 4,
a panel of three judges chaired by a member of the Social Democratic Party ruled that
the current situation in Kabul cannot be considered ‘reasonable’ for removal and that the
asylum seeker therefore had to be granted subsidiary protection. Two months later, on
September 3, another panel consisting of three different judges chaired by an indepen-
dent judge rejected the appeal of the other asylum seeker: the panel wrote in their verdict
that removal to Afghanistan is both ‘reasonable’ and ‘admissible’. In consequence, the
rejected asylum seeker had to leave Switzerland within a few days for an uncertain fate
in war-torn Afghanistan. A close reading of the two verdicts1 reveals few differences in
the merits of the cases that could explain the radically different outcomes. This raises
a question that touches upon fundamental legal principles: If not the cases’ merits, do
the different judges on the panels explain the differences between these, and potentially
other, verdicts?
Consistency in adjudication is central to the legitimacy of the judiciary and the rule
of law (see, e.g., Kornhauser and Sager 1986). Condensed to the Aristotelian maxim that
“like cases should be treated alike”, consistency features prominently in theories of justice
as a safeguard of fair treatment of disputing parties and of the predictability of the court’s
decisions (see, e.g., Marmor 2007, for an overview). And only a court that applies the
same legal rules (and consequences) to the same stipulated set of relevant circumstances
(Kornhauser and Sager 1986, p. 104) can fulfill the promise of ‘equality before the law’—a
legal principle that is fundamental to the rule of law in liberal democracies and frequently
enshrined in the constitution (and in the case of the U.S., directly above the main entrance
to the Supreme Court). In Switzerland, for example, Article 8(1) of the constitution
guarantees that “every person is equal before the law.” Since inconsistency in judicial
decision making, that is, different decisions for cases of the same merits and law, violates
1See FAC decisions E-3570/2006 and D-4576/2007.
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the very essence of the isonomy principle of equality before the law, it has been the
subject of much empirical scholarship—running the gamut from partisan adjudication of
challenges to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Revesz 1997) to ethnic in-group
bias in Israeli small claims courts (Shayo and Zussman 2011).
In the context of asylum adjudication, a small but growing literature, primarily fo-
cused on the U.S. and Canada, has examined disparities at several stages of the asylum
process, from the initial application to the final appeal at the highest courts (Ramji-
Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag 2007; Rehaag 2007; Fischman 2011). All these studies
find substantial heterogeneity in the decisions of asylum officers, judges and appeal courts.
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag (2007), for instance, show that for Colombian
cases before the Miami Immigration Court, judges’ grant rate varied between 5% and
88%.
Some of the asylum processes covered by these studies2 feature (quasi-) random assign-
ment of cases to asylum officers or judges, which allows the authors to causally attribute
differences in grant rates to the different decision makers. These studies often rely on data
obtained (often through Freedom of Information requests) from governing institutions,
which usually insist on protecting the identity of the decision maker and replacing it with
an anonymous identifier. This lack of data renders it impossible to connect estimates of
judges’ ideal points with their personal characteristics such as ethnicity, gender or par-
tisanship. Thus, most existing research is limited to documenting variation in asylum
appeal adjudication, without being able to shed light on how judges’ ideology explains
this variation.3
Another limitation of this literature concerns the courts that have been studied. Most
empirical research to date has focused on U.S. and Canadian courts, where—in line with
2Fischman (2011) focuses on asylum appeals at the U.S. federal circuit court level, which
features random assignment. The U.S. immigration courts studied by Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz and Schrag (2007) also use random assignment of cases within courts, but
assignment to the 53 courts is based on residence, which likely confounds comparisons
across courts.
3One exception, focusing on layman judges in Sweden, is Martén (2015).
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the common law tradition—not only the verdict, but also judges’ dissenting opinions are
disclosed. In contrast, the principles of collegiality and secrecy of deliberations are more
strongly rooted in continental European courts belonging to the civil law system. As a
consequence of this tradition, only the verdict of the entire panel is published, but not
dissenting judgements (see, e.g. Ginsburg 1990). This applies to the vast majority of
ordinary, and many constitutional, courts in European civil law countries including Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and the Netherlands,
among others (for an excellent overview, see Raffaelli 2012). Lacking the methodological
tools to infer individual preferences from group decisions, the empirical evidence on ju-
dicial preference variation stems mostly from North America.4 This narrow geographic
focus means that our allegedly general theories of judicial behavior and judicial politics
are put to test in only a handful of countries rooted in a particular legal tradition. If and
how these theories also apply to civil law courts that abstain from disclosing dissenting
opinions remains a largely unanswered question.
We overcome these limitations by leveraging a new methodology to analyze panel
decisions of the Swiss FAC. As a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Switzerland
grants asylum seekers whose claims are rejected the right to appeal the initial decision.
Since 2007, the approximately thirty judges of the FAC centrally review these appeals, and
decide on about 3,000 cases per year. In contrast to most other countries and essential for
our analysis, judges serving on the Swiss FAC have a publicly known party membership
and are voted into judicial office by the members of the national parliament. While
not written law, there is an informal agreement that the body of elected judges reflects
the relative seat share of the different parties in parliament. These voluntary party
4Studies focused on civil law countries that publish dissenting judgements cover Israeli
courts (Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010; Shayo and Zussman 2011; Grossman
et al. 2016), the European Court of Human Rights (Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008),
the French, German, Portuguese and Spanish constitutional courts (Hönnige 2009; Han-
retty 2012) as well as several Latin American courts, in particular in Argentinia, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico (see Kapiszewski and Taylor 2008; Helmke and Staton 2011, for
overviews).
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quotas ensure that the whole spectrum of political ideology in Swiss society is adequately
represented on the court (Kiener 2001). One potential drawback of this heavily politicized
nomination process—and the focus of this study—is that judges might be incentivized to
reach verdicts in line with the preferences of the party that selects them.
To analyze judicial behavior on the FAC, we develop a new methodology that allows
us to infer individual preferences from group decisions, even when dissenting opinions
are not recorded. As described in more detail below, the proposed methodology exploits
the quasi-random assignment of judges to thousands of panels to test which model of
group decision making best fits the aggregate panel outcomes. We explore the empirical
fit of various decision-theoretic models including: majority rule, which implies that the
median judge is decisive; unanimity rule to grant (reject) an appeal, which implies that
the most restrictive (lenient) judge is decisive; and chair-as-dictator, which implies that
the chair judge, who writes the first draft of the verdict, is decisive. Conditional on
these aggregation rules, we can then infer and estimate individual preferences using item-
response theory models.
Besides the non-disclosure of dissenting opinions, scholars of judicial behavior inter-
ested in disparities in adjudication typically face a host of additional inferential challenges.
Fortunately, several features of the Swiss asylum appeal process conspire and help us to
overcome them. First, all appeals have a common, unidimensional structure, since they
exclusively deal with asylum issues. While the assumption that judges’ preferences are
dominantly unidimensional is often invoked in the empirical study of judicial politics,
there is historical (Greenhouse 2007; Jeffries 2001) and statistical (Lauderdale and Clark
2012) evidence that judges’ preferences vary across areas of the law. In the present con-
text, however, the unidimensionality assumption seems much more credible, as all verdicts
typically involve the appeal of an initial asylum or subsidiary protection decision, or a
closely related asylum matter.
Second, the FAC handles all asylum appeals lodged in Switzerland. In other studies
(for example, Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag 2007), differences in the average
merit of cases submitted to different regional offices (U.S. Immigration Courts) frequently
undermine the comparability of preferences across offices. This is not a concern in our
context, where all appeals are centrally processed by the two asylum appeal divisions of
the FAC.
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Third, at the FAC, a bespoke software program with the sole objective function to
minimize workload imbalance assigns cases to panels of three judges. The automated
assignment is independent of the merits of a case and judges’ characteristics conditional
on the language of the asylum decision. This conditionally random allocation of judges to
thousands of panels gives us inferential leverage to causally attribute differences in grant
rates to differences in panel composition.
Fourth, not only are judges elected to office by the Swiss parliament, but their iden-
tities and party affiliations are also public knowledge. This allows us to go consider-
ably beyond existing studies of asylum adjudication that had to work with anonymized
decision-maker identifiers, and to correlate estimated grant rates with judges’ ideology,
proxied by their party membership.
Analyzing the universe of almost 35,000 verdicts decided by the FAC between 2007–
2015, we find that the best-fitting simple aggregation rule is that the panel chair dictates
the outcome, closely followed by majority rule for which the median judge is decisive.
Turning to more complex aggregation rules, we find that a (Bayesian) mixture model of
the chair and median models fits better than either of these simple aggregation rules,
indicating that the chair judge can sometimes, but not always, deviate from the median’s
preference. Based on this mixture model, we show that asylum seekers who submitted
comparable appeals in 2007 faced substantially different grant rates, depending on the
panel of judges their case was assigned to. This heterogeneity in judges’ preferences
strongly correlates with party affiliation in expected ways: on average, judges from the
right-wing Swiss People’s Party have a preferred grant rate of 6.0%. In stark contrast,
the preferred grant rate of judges from the left-wing Social Democratic Party is 17.5%,
almost three times higher.
We also explore the evolution of the inconsistency in the court’s decisions after its
inception in 2007. While the inconsistency rate, i.e., the proportion of cases that would
have been decided differently if the consensus of the court were consistently applied, fluc-
tuates between 3.0% and 6.4%, we find no evidence that judges’ preferences converged
over time. The persistence of substantial inconsistency suggests that the issue of prefer-
ence variation in asylum appeal adjudication is a permanent fixture of this court and its
partisan judges.
Our study makes several contributions. First, our findings have important implications
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for the comparative literature that studies disparities in asylum adjudication. While
many studies show sizeable disparities in asylum adjudication between decision makers
that potentially face different cases (Law 2004; Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag
2007; Taylor 2007), our results provide clear causal evidence that the identity of judges
matters when facing cases with, in expectation, the same merit.
Second, we add new empirical evidence to the growing literature on the effects of
judges’ identity on their decisions. Previous research has shown that characteristics such
as gender (Boyd, Epstein and Martin 2010; Glynn and Sen 2015; Peresie 2005), ethnicity
or race (Abrams, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2012; Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan
2010; Grossman et al. 2016; Shayo and Zussman 2011) and ideology (Ashenfelter, Eisen-
berg and Schwab 1995; Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013; Sunstein et al. 2007) all affect
judicial behavior. We provide some of the most direct evidence to date that judges’ po-
litical ideology, proxied by their party affiliation, shapes preferences over asylum appeals
in expected ways.
Third, our study adds to the growing literature on group decision making (Bonneau
et al. 2007; Sunstein et al. 2007), preference aggregation (Fischman 2011; Van Dijk, Son-
nemans and Bauw 2014) and interaction among panel members (Fischman 2013; Kastellec
2013). Previous studies (e.g., Fischman 2011) that infer individual preferences using item-
response theory-type models rely on the individual votes of decision makers. We explore
a context where individual votes are not reported, and only the group’s joint verdict is
observed. Nonetheless, by leveraging the random and repeated allocation of judges to
panels, we are able to recover individual preferences from joint group decisions by fit-
ting a variety of aggregation rules. In addition to providing ideal point estimates for
each judge, this new methodology also allows us to test which decision-theoretic model
best describes the group decisions. The methodological framework we develop to study
panel decisions at the FAC can easily be adapted to other courts, where dissenting opin-
ions are not reported. This opens up the possibility to empirically study the behavior
of judges on dozens of civil law courts across continental Europe that were heretofore
out of methodological reach. In addition, this framework has the potential for a wide
range of applications beyond the study of judicial behavior, since joint decisions without
any recorded information on individual votes is the norm in many decision environments
relevant for political science and neighbouring disciplines.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides background
information about the structure of decision making at the FAC and the election of its
judges. Section III describes the proposed methodology based on the case-space model,
how we infer individual preferences from group decisions, and how we estimate the court’s
inconsistency rate over time. After summarizing the data and measures in Section IV,
we detail the results in Section V. In the conclusion, we discuss the legal and political
implications of our findings and point to other areas, outside of the realm of judicial
politics, where our methodology could be fruitfully applied.
II Asylum Appeals and the Swiss Federal Administrative Court
Like many other countries, Switzerland grants asylum in accordance with the 1951 Refugee
Convention (and the 1967 Protocol). Asylum applications are processed by the State Sec-
retariat for Migration (SEM). Of the 26,000 asylum applications decided in 2012, roughly
the mid-point of our study period, only 15% were granted (UNHCR 2013) and more than
10% were appealed.5 In the event of a negative substantive decision,6 the applicant has
thirty days to lodge an appeal.7 Since its inception in 2007, the FAC handles all such
appeals. Because the verdicts of the FAC are, in general, not appealable to the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, the FAC is effectively the court of last resort in the Swiss asylum
5Viewed in a comparative perspective, Switzerland received a relatively high share of
asylum applications in the last decade (see, e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner
2017). Similar to developments in many other European countries, the increasing number
of asylum applications in recent years has made asylum policies, including the appeal
process, a heavily contested issue, with right-wing parties, such as the Swiss People’s
Party, leveraging it as an effective springboard for rallying their voters.
6A negative substantive decision is the rejection of an asylum application that the SEM
has tried substantively, i.e., one in which the SEM has ‘entered into the substance of the
case’.
7If the asylum request is dismissed without entering into the substance of the case, the
appeal window shortens to only five working days.
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process.
A Election of Judges by the Swiss Parliament
The approximately thirty asylum judges belonging to the two divisions of the FAC handle,
on average, about 3,000 asylum appeals per year. Unlike in countries where the executive
branch nominates candidates for judicial office, in Switzerland, judges of the FAC are
nominated and voted into office by the United Federal Assembly, i.e., the joint meeting of
the two chambers of the Swiss National Parliament. A term lasts for six years, but there
is no limit on the number of terms that judges are allowed to serve. In recent years, all
judicial candidates had a known party affiliation and were backed by their party when
running for office.8 While not written law, there is an informal rule that the body of
elected judges reflects the relative seat share of the different parties in parliament. The
fundamental norm underlying this informal rule is to select a judiciary that is represen-
tative of the people it serves(Kiener 2001; Raselli 2011). By enforcing that all parties get
the number of judges that is approximately proportional to their strength in parliament,
this “Magic Formula” ensures that the whole range of political ideologies is ‘adequately’
represented at the court.9
A potential drawback of electing the judiciary is the threat of a heavily politicized
court. If judges see themselves primarily as agents of their respective party, we might
worry that their verdicts are not only following the ‘law’, but are also motivated by
their parties’ ideology. This could either be the result of a selection process by which
parties nominate judges that are ideologically close (or, observationally equivalent, judges
8In the first election for this court, a few candidates ran as independents. More recently,
the only exception was a candidate who is a supporter of the Green Party without being
a formal member.
9Note, however, that this principle of proportionality is not strictly enforced, if, for ex-
ample, the judiciary commission cannot find candidates with the relevant qualifications
for underrepresented parties. In particular Swiss People’s Party, which holds the most
seats in the parliament, has been underrepresented at the FAC, especially in the court’s
early years.
8
joining parties according to their ideology) or a consequence of the re-election process that
incentivizes judges to reach verdicts in line with the preferences of their party. With both
mechanisms, we would expect to see substantial variation in the adjudication of asylum
appeals across judges from different parties, and a correlation between judges’ grant rates
and their parties’ general stance on asylum issues.
B Asylum Appeal Procedure and the Structure of Panel Decisions
When receiving a new asylum appeal, the FAC identifies the language of the asylum
decision (German, French, or Italian) and forwards, on an alternating basis, the case
to one of the chambers of its two asylum divisions. A bespoke software prog ram called
Bandlimat, named after the first president of the FAC, assigns the appeal to a three-judge
panel and determines judges’ roles as chair, second and third judge. When sequentially
assigning cases to judges, the Bandlimat solely considers (i) the language of the asylum
decision, (ii) the urgency of the appeal, (iii) judges’ language skills and (iv) their current
workload. The assignment of cases is completely mechanical, and non-compliance with
the software’s assignment has to be justified, logged and entered by the head of the
division.10 The sole objective function of the software is to minimize the imbalance in
workload created by case assignment (each case has an identical weight of one) under
constraints (i)–(iv). With the exception of the language of the appeal, all constraints
are orthogonal to the identity and characteristics of judges, such that in expectation, the
assignment of cases by the Bandlimat is (conditional on language or origin country) as
good as random. We use a series of placebo checks to validate this assumption in the
section after next.
The court employs two distinct decision-making procedures to decide on asylum ap-
peals.11 Both procedures are file-review processes without a hearing. During the first year
10The head of division can also instruct a few designated FAC employees to change the
panel composition on her behalf; for details, see the law guiding the FAC’s standard
operating procedure (the the Administrative Court Act).
11Note that cases that do not fulfill the formal requirements are ‘dismissed without en-
tering into the substance of the case’ by the chair judge in a single-judge procedure.
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of the court’s existence, all substantively tried cases were handled through the ‘ordinary
procedure’ that is characterized by the following structure: the chair judge receives the
case files, conducts additional investigations if necessary, instructs one of her clerks to
draft a decision and forwards all materials including the draft verdict to the second judge.
The second judge reads the case files and draft decision, either agrees, or disagrees and
proposes changes, and forwards everything to the third judge. The third judge reads the
case files, the draft decision and the comments of the second judge, and either agrees, or
disagrees and proposes changes, and returns the file and her comments to the chair. In
the event of disagreement, the panel further circulates and possibly revises the decision.
If the three judges are not able to reach a consensus, the outcome is decided by majority
rule.
A partial revision of the Swiss Asylum Law led to the introduction of an alternative
‘simplified procedure’. Since January 1, 2008, the simplified procedure allows the chair
judge to classify certain cases as either ‘clearly with or without merit’. In the vast majority
of cases, the simplified procedure is applied to appeals that are ‘clearly without merit’.
The initial assignment of cases to three-judge panels is the same for both procedures.
When the chair judge invokes the simplified procedure, she only needs the second judge
to agree with her classification and the verdict. If the second judge agrees with both, the
decision-making process ends here, and the file is not forwarded to the third judge. If the
second judge disagrees, the process reverts to the ordinary procedure. Clearly, appeals
decided by the simplified procedure are a selective subset of all cases. Furthermore,
our analysis, discussed in detail below, reveals that judges vary considerably in their
propensity to invoke the simplified procedure. To circumnavigate any selection issues
arising from these differing interpretations of what constitutes appeals ‘clearly with or
without merit’, the analysis proceeds by focusing on complementary subsets of the data.
First, we focus on the substantively tried appeals that were submitted in 2007—before the
introduction of the simplified procedure—and handled by three-judge panels. Building on
these cases decided under the ordinary procedure, we test which decision-making rules fit
the data best, and estimate judges’ preferences and the court’s inconsistency rate. Next,
we analyze all appeals decided between 2007–2015, independent of the procedure used to
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decide the case, to explore the evolution of preference variation over time.12
III Methodology
A Inferring Individual Preferences from Panel Decisions Using the Case-Space Model
To estimate individual preferences from the observed aggregate decisions of three-judge
panels, we need a framework for modelling preference aggregation. We adopt a unidi-
mensional case-space model (Kornhauser 1992), which allows us to theoretically describe
the preferences of judges and to map different preference aggregation rules onto likelihood
estimators. Each case j has facts that can be described as a location ψj . We treat smaller
values of ψj as indicating stronger appeals (case facts) and larger values of ψj as weaker
appeals. Each judge i has preferences that can be described as a cutpoint θi. Each judge,
if deciding the case alone, would rule in favor of the appellant if and only if ψj < θi.
Thus, judges with lower cutpoints θi are inclined to grant fewer appeals, and judges with
higher cutpoints are inclined to grant more appeals. An assumption of this unidimen-
sional model is that all judges agree on the ranking of relative merits of appeals and
disagree only on the threshold to apply. While this assumption seems reasonable in the
present context where all cases concern asylum appeals, it does have some implications
for interpretation, which we discuss below.
The top two axes of Figure 1 show two different hypothetical judges and the decisions
they would make if they decided cases alone. However, the cases we are studying are
decided jointly by (up to) three judges according to the procedures described in the
preceding section, and so the resolution of cases in which the three judges disagree (bottom
axis of Figure 1) depends on the aggregation rule that combines their preferences into a
decision.
12December 31, 2015, is the end point of our study period because the FAC created a new
division that also processes asylum decisions, making further comparisons over time
more difficult.
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Figure 1: Mapping between Preferences and Decisions
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Note: The top two axes illustrate the mapping between preferences and hypothetical single-judge decisions.
The bottom axis illustrates the three-judge decisions that are actually observed, indicating the range of cases
over which decisions depend on which preference aggregation rule most closely matches the court’s decision
making.
To map the aggregation rules onto a likelihood estimator, we introduce the following
notation. Let i(j) be the indices of the judges hearing case j, so that θi(j) is a three-
component vector, with the first element θ1(j) corresponding to the chair, the second
θ2(j) to the second judge and the third θ3(j) to the third judge. We consider only those
aggregation rules that can be described by a function f(θi(j)) that maps the preferences
of the three judges into an effective preference of the panel.13 This allows us to define a
generic likelihood function for the observable decision of the panel to grant (yj = 1) or
13It is difficult to make a substantive argument for the kinds of non-monotonic preference
aggregation functions that could not be described as a mapping of the three judges’
preferences into a single effective preference on the same scale.
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In the next section, we reparametrize f(θi(j)) as a function of various aggregation rules.
B Decision-Theoretic Aggregation Rules
We consider a range of decision-theoretic preference aggregation models in our analysis.
While other aggregation rules are certainly possible, we believe that our set of rules
comprises the most likely candidates—not just for this application, but also for other
contexts where the researcher only observes the group’s joint decision, not the individual
votes.
If we imagine the panel voting by majority rule internally, we expect the median judge,
θmed, to determine the outcome. If we imagine the panel voting with a requirement of a
unanimity rule to grant an appeal, θmin, i.e., the most restrictive judge, determines the
outcome. If instead unanimity is required to reject an appeal, θmax, i.e., the most lenient
judge, determines the outcome. Lastly, if the chair’s preference dictates the outcome,
we would expect θ1 to be decisive. Note that for three-judge panels, we cannot point
identify, but only bound, the preferences of most extreme judges under certain models.
For example, if we assume the median judge’s preference determines the outcome, we
cannot point identify the preferences of either the judge with the lowest or the highest
threshold for asylum appeal cases. Similarly, for the minimum and maximum models, we
cannot identify the two highest and the two lowest preferences, respectively. However,
we can identify which judges these are and bound their θ with the next most extreme
judge’s position.
We fit models corresponding to these, as well as three additional and less plausible
aggregation functions, in our empirical analysis. In addition to a null model where all
judges/panels apply the same threshold, θ0, that serves as a baseline, we also specify
an aggregation rule where the second, θ2, and third judge, θ3, respectively, dictate the
outcome. We do not expect these last two aggregation rules to fit the data well but
include them as plausibility tests. Table 1 provides an overview of the different simple
aggregation rules:
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Table 1: Overview Decision-Theoretic Rules
Notation Aggregation Rule
θmin Most restrictive judge decides
θmax Most lenient judge decides
θmed Median judge decides
θ1 Chair judge decides
θ2 Second judge decides
θ3 Third judge decides
θ0 All judges/panels apply same threshold
Note: Table displays the decision-theoretic rules used
to aggregate individual preferences of panel members.
Assumptions over aggregation rules have implications for the estimation of preferences.
Since judges’ preferences are estimated conditional on the aggregation rule, model fit
depends both on the predictive performance of the preferences and the aggregation rule.
For this reason, we test a variety of aggregation rules, compare their statistical fit, choose
the one(s) with the best fit, and focus on those empirical relationships that are robust to
reasonable choices of aggregation rule.
In that spirit, we also consider a mixture model of two of the simple aggregation
rules. We do so because the mixture model might better reflect the sequentiality of
decision making and the constraints that judges are facing than either of the simple
aggregation rules alone. As noted above, the chair of the panel initially receives the case
files, reviews them and sets out a draft decision. Then, the second and third judges get
the opportunity to review the file and the draft decision in turn, and only if there are
unresolvable disagreements after another round of circulation (and a potential discussion)
is a decision by majority rule taken. This is clearly a costly process in terms of time and
effort for all judges involved. Yet, whereas the chair judge gets to frame the decision and
has to invest time and effort to draft it, there is an incentive for the second and third
judges to follow the chair’s draft decision, rather than engaging in the effort necessary to
determine if they disagree, let alone formulating an alternative to the chair’s provisional
decision.
One way of thinking about the incentives set up by this process is to consider the cost
in terms of time and effort to determine the case facts ψj that each judge has to pay.
Because the chair judge must pay the cost in any case, but the second and third judges
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do not, we can expect that some decisions taken by the chair may be at odds with the
preference of the median judge, but the other two judges cannot know which decisions
if they do not pay the cost of review. While we do not explicitly formulate a complete
game-theoretic model here, we note that the mixture model we estimate approximates
the logic of a mixed-strategy equilibrium14 in an oversight game, while the chair and
median models correspond to two different pure strategy equilibria. Which of these we
observe depends on the cost of review for the second and third judges relative to the cost
of cases being decided “incorrectly” from their perspective. If review costs are low relative
to error costs, oversight always occurs and we would expect the median’s preferences to
always prevail. If review costs are very high relative to error costs, oversight never occurs,
and we expect the chair to determine the outcome. The mixture model corresponds to
intermediate cases where there is sometimes oversight and the chair is partially, but not
completely, able to dictate decision making.
To translate the essence of this idea into a statistical model, we estimate a mixture
model of the chair and median aggregation rules.15 Let λ1 and λmed be the probability of
the chair and the median judge deciding the case, respectively, such that λmed = 1− λ1.
The corresponding mixture of aggregation functions
f(θi(j)) = λ1f(θ1(j)) + (1− λ1)f(θmed(j)) (2)
is then plugged into the likelihood function (Equation 1) above.
C Measuring the Consistency of Decision Making
Given the case-space model, we can also calculate the extent to which random assignment
of judges leads to inconsistency in the decisions that the court makes. Let θj be the
preferences of the judges hearing case j, let θ̃j be the consensus of the court, and let f(ψ)
be the distribution of case facts. On average acrossM cases, the fraction of cases decided
14The existence of such mixed-strategy equilibria depends on assumptions about the util-
ity functions of the judges and the costs of review.
15We also tested other mixture models, for example between the median and second judge,
but all of these fitted, as expected, significantly worse.
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To compute the quantity E , we need a benchmark for what decisions an entirely
consistent court ought to make. We estimate E [π|Xj ], the expected grant rate conditional
on covariatesXj , such as country of origin, that predict case strength, but excluding which
judges heard the case. We then take the mean absolute difference between the predicted
probabilities of granted appeals for each judge, π̂j , and this benchmark, E [π|Xj ], to







|π̂j − E [π|Xj ]| . (4)
If we would not condition on covariates Xj , E [π|Xj ] would reduce to the mean appeal
grant rate over all cases E [π], and the inconsistency rate would reduce to the mean
absolute error of the fitted values. This offers some intuition into why this measure
captures inconsistency. If the set of judges hearing the case does not matter, then the
fitted values, i.e., the predicted probabilities of granted appeals given the identities of the
judges, should not vary at all. To the extent they do, this indicates that the judges matter
and cases are being decided differently depending on which judges hear those cases. This
measure, Ê , assumes again that judges only disagree about thresholds, not the relative
merits of cases. That means that Ê provides a lower bound on the court’s inconsistency.
If judges also disagree about relative merits, the true inconsistency of the court will be
higher than what our estimate of Ê suggests.
D Verifying Random Assignment Conditional on Observables
In the previous section, we discussed how the automated case assignment by the Ban-
dlimat software takes the language of the appeal and the language skills of the judges
into account. This feature of the assignment process has implications for our statistical
analysis. For example, French-speaking asylum seekers from Côte d’Ivoire, with typically
low asylum grant rates, are likely to submit their asylum application in French-speaking
Switzerland (rather than the German-speaking part), which in turn determines the lan-
guage of both the asylum decision and the eventual appeal. In this case, we would worry
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that the judges operating in different official Swiss languages (French, German and Ital-
ian) face cases from different origin countries and therefore of differing case strength. In
order to account for this threat to internal validity, we adjust for origin country in all our
models.
To further substantiate the credibility of the assumption that cases are randomly
assigned conditional on origin country, we conduct a series of placebo tests. In a first
step, we leverage the available case characteristics to gauge their predictive power of the
appeal outcome. This is similar in spirit to a manipulation check following a randomized
experiment (see Frandsen, Lefgren and Leslie 2019, for a similar test). For this, we rely
on the coding of the FAC that classifies cases into legal matters right at the opening of
the proceedings. In addition, we use our own coding of all published verdicts (87% of all
verdicts) to code if the appellant was represented by a lawyer or paralegal. After verifying
that these case characteristics are indeed predictive of the success of the appeal, we turn
to our placebo tests. In line with the two best-fitting simple aggregation rules (discussed
below), we estimate the general leniency of the judges on the panel. In particular, we
estimate the average grant rate of the chair judge from all panels that she chaired except
for the case j under consideration. Similarly, we estimate the leniency of the median
judge i as the average grant rate of all panels on which judge i served but for case j
under consideration. We would expect that the strength of case j is not predictive of the
general leniency of the chair or median judge on the panel if the assumption of random
assignment conditional origin country is correct. Table 2 confirms that this is indeed the
case.
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Table 2: Manipulation Check and Placebo Tests
Appeal granted Leniency Chair Leniency Median
(1) (2) (3)
Enforcement of return 0.288 (0.187) 0.017 (0.056) 0.023 (0.027)
Inadmissibility of request 0.073 (0.025) 0.005 (0.008) −0.002 (0.004)
Refusal temp. protection 0.856 (0.394) 0.202 (0.118) −0.030 (0.056)
Revocation temp. protection 0.155 (0.051) 0.037 (0.015) 0.015 (0.007)
Family reunification 0.053 (0.095) 0.021 (0.029) 0.003 (0.014)
Revocation of asylum 0.140 (0.097) 0.034 (0.029) 0.014 (0.014)
Asylum and return (RR) 0.119 (0.051) 0.031 (0.015) 0.017 (0.007)
Return / enforcement (RR) 0.338 (0.263) 0.088 (0.079) 0.036 (0.038)
Asylum request abroad 0.049 (0.052) 0.016 (0.016) 0.005 (0.007)
Asylum procedure (other) 0.299 (0.053) 0.012 (0.016) 0.010 (0.008)
Allocation to canton 0.012 (0.168) 0.062 (0.050) 0.012 (0.024)
Lawyer / paralegal 0.111 (0.022) −0.002 (0.007) 0.001 (0.003)
Country FE (# 94) X X X
Observations 1,521 1,521 1,521
R2 0.234 0.128 0.102
Joint F -test 0.000 0.192 0.187
Note: Table shows ordinary least squares regressions of a binary indicator (=1 if the
appeal is granted) (Model 1), the average grant rate of the chair judge across all decisions
but for case j (Model 2), and the grant rate of the median judge on the panel across
all decisions but for case j (Model 3). All models control for 94 country of origin fixed
effects. The baseline category is “asylum and return”. RR indicates reconsideration
requests (following initial rejections). The joint F -test reports the p-value from the null
hypothesis that all case strength characteristics, i.e. the legal matter and if the appellant
was represented by a lawyer or paralegal, are not predictive of the outcome. In line with
the main analysis discussed below, the sample consists of all published cases submitted
in 2007 and decided by three-judge panels.
Model 1 shows that case strength characteristics strongly predict the outcome of the
appeal, as expected. For example, being represented by a lawyer or paralegal is associated
with an 11 percentage point higher probability of winning the appeal. When replacing
the dependent variable with the general leniency of the chair judge (Model 2) and of the
median judge (Model 3) on the panel, respectively, we find that conditional on country
of origin, the case characteristics fail to reach (joint) statistical significance. The p-
values from the joint F -tests are both around 0.19, clearly above any conventional level
of significance.
18
IV Data: Sample, Outcome Measure and Covariates
We obtained the data that form the basis of our analysis directly from the FAC.16 The
key dependent variable measures the outcome of the verdict. While the FAC employs a
relatively fine-grained measure of appeal outcomes, we collapse this information into a
binary measure, where an appeal is coded as ‘granted’ if the verdict potentially leads to
an improvement of the appellant’s situation (independent of whether the first instance
decision is reversed or remanded) and ‘rejected’ otherwise (independent of whether the
appeal is rejected or dismissed).
In addition to the outcome measure, the data obtained from the FAC contain the
following information: the unique case id, submission date, decision date, the panel com-
position and the role of the judges, the language of the appeal and the appellant’s country
of origin. For published decisions, the large majority of cases, this information is also
available on the court’s online database.17 We cross-checked the two data sources to con-
firm that we obtained the complete set of cases and the accuracy of the information. We
complement this database with personal information about the judges, most importantly
their party affiliation, which we compiled from judges’ CVs on the official website of the
FAC and supplemented with information from the minutes of the National Council.18
As part of the data-sharing agreement reached with the FAC, we agreed to abstain from
revealing the judges’ names. In the following, we replace the name of each judge with a




judges.html for short bios of sitting judges.
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unique id and an indicator of his or her party affiliation.19
Overall, the dataset contains the universe of all 40,506 unique decisions made by a
total of 42 asylum judges between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2015.20 Of the full
set of cases, we drop 13.5% that were either ‘written off’ or received ‘another’ decision
that cannot be considered as clearly in favor or against the appellant. In addition, we
drop 107 cases that are decided by five-judge panels. In the Appendix, we provide detailed
descriptive statistics for the 34,926 appeals in our estimation sample, of which, employing
our binary outcome measure, 14% are granted and 86% rejected. Table T.1 shows grant
rates grouped by panel characteristics, Table T.2 the breakdown of cases by legal category,
Table T.3 the caseload by judge, and Table T.4 the proportion of cases by origin country
of the appellant.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we focus on substantively tried cases sub-
mitted in the first year of the court’s existence that were decided by three judges to test
which aggregation rule fits the panel decisions best.21 In the second part, we follow the
evolution of judges’ preferences and the court’s consistency over the years 2007–2015. For
this year-by-year analysis, we group appeals by decision year to increase the comparability
19We, the authors, as well as the FAC, are well aware that this partial anonymization is
incomplete at best, and that it would be fairly straightforward to figure out the identity
of the judges using publicly available information. Nevertheless, we do believe that
reporting anynomyzed results is helpful in focusing the discussion of our findings on
structural issues of the court, rather than on the behavior of individual judges.
20If several appeals were unified and received a joint decision, we recorded it as one
observation (this concerns 451 decisions). Occasionally, judges from other divisions of
the FAC serve on asylum appeal panels. We classified all those judges into one category
“other”.
21Note that the cases that do not fulfill the formal requirements are dismissed ‘without
entering into the substance of the case’ by the chair judge in a single-judge procedure.
Since these cases are decided by single judges as opposed to panels of judges, we exclude
them from this part of the analysis.
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of cases over time.22
V Results
A Which Aggregation Rule Fits Panel Decisions Best?
In order to understand how individual preferences are aggregated into a joint panel de-
cision, we begin by fitting a series of models using the aggregation rules introduced in
the previous section: preference of the most restrictive judge (min), most lenient judge
(max), median, chair, and the mixture model combining the latter two rules. In addition,
we include the preference of second and third judge and the null model as plausibility
tests, but do not expect them to fit well. Therefore, they provide us with a check that our
estimation approach has statistical power against implausible alternatives. All of these
models have one degree of freedom per judge, except for the null model, which only fits
a constant, and the mixture model which adds the mixing parameter.
During our extensive test runs, we found that for some models, the maximum likeli-
hood estimates are somewhat dependent on the starting values, indicating that we might
only find local, not global maxima. Hence, we resort to Bayesian Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) to estimate our models, which is better suited to explore the entire poste-
rior density. We add hierarchical random effects priors for each judge, but the substantive
results are the same with flat priors. All models control for appellants’ country of origin.
To facilitate the comparison across models, we employ the Deviance Information Criteria
(DIC), a Bayesian generalization of the AIC, to assess model fit.
22Because of the difference in classifying cases according to their submission date (for
the first part of the analysis) or decision date (for the second part of the analysis), the
preference estimates and inconsistency rate for 2007 will slightly differ between the two
parts.
21
Table 3: Fit Statistics for Preference Aggregation Rules
DIC LL Inconsistency Rate 95% Credible Interval Parameters
mixture 1430.4 -705.1 0.06 0.05, 0.08 119
chair 1440.1 -710.8 0.06 0.04, 0.07 118
median 1441.3 -709.1 0.06 0.04, 0.08 118
max 1453.0 -716.4 0.09 0.05, 0.13 118
min 1460.6 -719.9 0.09 0.04, 0.16 118
second 1486.4 -733.3 0.03 0.01, 0.05 118
null 1491.7 -739.5 0.00 —, — 91
third 1492.5 -738.2 0.02 0.00, 0.03 118
Note: Table of fit statistics for Bayesian estimates of judges’ preferences in 2007 under
the mixture, chair, median, max (most lenient), min (most restrictive), second, and third
judge, and the null model. Models are sorted by Deviance Information Criteria (DIC)
shown in Column 1. Column 2 shows the log likelihood statistic. Columns 3 and 4 show
the inconsistency rate and associated 95% credible interval. Note that the inconsistency
rate for the null model is by definition zero. Column 5 shows the number of estimated
parameters.
Table 3 shows the results. We first discuss the simple, i.e., non-mixture, aggregation
rules. The best-fitting simple aggregation rule is the chair judge, closely followed by the
median model. The difference in the DIC between these two non-nested models with the
same number of parameters is 1.2, indicating that chair model fits the data only marginally
better than the median model. All of the other non-mixture models fit considerably worse
than these two according to the DIC. That (one of) the best-fitting simple aggregation
rule posits that the chair judge decides as dictator is a theoretically compelling result,
given the structure of the decision procedure followed by the court. Because the chair
sees the case first and writes the initial draft of the decision, she has an opportunity to
frame the decision, while the second and third judges have an incentive to not investigate
the case as thoroughly as they would if they were the chair. However, the results also
indicate that the preferences of the second and third judge matter to some extent. If the
other judges exerted no constraint on the chair, we would expect a larger and statistically
meaningful difference between the chair and the median model in terms of the DIC.
Next, we turn to the results from the mixture model to more explicitly investigate the
trade-off faced by second and third judge between paying the cost for review and letting
the chair decide. The comparison between the mixture and the chair or median models
is aided by their nested structure (c.f. equation 2): the chair model, θ1, is a special case
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of the mixture with λ1 = 1, and the median model is a special case of the mixture with
λ1 = 0. Table 3 shows that the mixture model performs significantly better than the
‘pure’ chair and median models. The estimated mixing parameter λ1 is 0.45 (95% CI
0.17-0.77), indicating that slightly less than half the cases are decided by the chair, and
slightly more than half by majority rule. The fact that the DIC is almost 10 points lower
(better) for the mixture model, and that λ1 is neither close to zero (in which case the
mixture would simplify to the median model) nor close to one (in which case the mixture
would simplify to the chair model), indicates that even when penalizing for higher model
complexity, a mixture of the chair and median judge models substantially outperforms
an aggregation rule in which the chair can always act as dictator or all cases are decided
by majority rule. Substantively, this implies that the chair judge has disproportionate,
but not absolute, control over the panel’s decision.
B Heterogeneity in Judges’ Preferences and Inconsistency of the Court
Having identified the best-fitting aggregation rule, this section explores the heterogeneity
in grant rates between judges in 2007, and how this impacts the consistency of decision
making at the court. Figure 2 shows the estimated preferences of the judges from the
mixture model that controls for origin country and uses hierarchical priors on the judges,
setting the country of origin effect to its average value. Table T.5 in the Appendix shows
the underlying numerical estimates.
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Note: Estimated preferences of judges from the best-fitting mixture model that controls
for origin country and uses hierarchical priors on judges, setting the country of origin
effect to its average value. Sample consists of all three-judge panel decisions on cases
submitted in 2007. Mixture probability for chair model: λ1 = .45. Posterior means
and 95% credible intervals. Parties are abbreviated as follows: Christian Democrats
(CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); non-partisan (Indep); Social Democrats (SP);
Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
Figure 2 reveals three striking features. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
preferences of judges, with preferred grant rates ranging between 5% and 34%. Second,
this heterogeneity is driven by variance both within and across parties. Third, despite rel-
evant within-party variation, there is a clear association between the preferences of judges
and their political affiliation in the expected direction. Judges affiliated with the leftist
Social Democratic Party (SP) are, on average, among the most favorable toward asylum
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seekers. Non-partisan judges and those affiliated with the centrist Christian Democracts
(CVP) exhibit the most intra-party variance, but both groups are on average close to
the court’s median. Judges affiliated with the center-right Free Democratic Party (FDP)
are the second most restrictive, while judges affiliated with the populist right-wing Swiss
People’s Party (SVP) are the least favorable toward asylum seekers. Figure F.1 in the
Appendix shows the voting behavior of MPs, averaged across parties, in the Swiss Na-
tional Council for the study period 2007 to 2015. We find that the estimated preference
ordering of the asylum judges on the FAC is entirely consistent with their parties’ general
stance on asylum policies.
The differences in preferences are substantively meaningful. For example, the most
lenient judge (SP, preferred grant rate = 33.8%: 95% CI: 16.0–62.7%) would, if s/he could
decide alone, achieve a grant rate that is almost eight times higher than the rate of the
most restrictive judge (SVP, preferred grant rate = 4.4%: 95% CI: 0.7–11.2%). Figure 2
makes clear that this preference variation is not restricted to the two most extreme judges.
For example, the difference in preferred grant rates for the five most lenient (average grant
rate = 21.0%) and five most restrictive judges (average grant rate = 5.2%) are similarly
sizeable and estimated with sufficient precision to be statistically meaningful.
How robust are these findings? Figures F.2 and F.3 in the Appendix show the corre-
sponding preference estimates from the (non-mixture) Bayesian chair and median model,
respectively. While there are some differences with regard to the point estimates for
the preferences and the implied ordering of judges from lenient to restrictive, the gen-
eral findings of a substantial variation in preferences, and their association with party
membership, are also clearly evident in those simpler models. In sum, we find across a
variety of models that the political ideology of judges, proxied by their party affiliation,
is a robust predictor of their preferred grant rate.
What does this heterogeneity in the preferences of the judges imply for the consistency
with which the court applies the law? To answer this question, we predict the probability
of a successful appeal for each composition of panels, as observed in 2007, and based on
the preference estimates from the best-fitting mixture model. If panel composition had
no effect on the success of appeals, we would predict a constant probability for all cases
(at the court’s average grant rate of 12.1% for 2007). In this case, the inconsistency rate
would be zero.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Predicted Probability of Appeal Success as a Function of the
Judges Serving on the Panel













Note: Empirical distribution of the predicted probability of
appeal success for each case under the mixture model, given
the observed compositions of three-judge panels for cases sub-
mitted in 2007 and controlling for origin country (and setting
the country of origin effect to its average value). The court’s
average predicted grant rate, indicated by the dashed black
line, is 12.1%.
Figure 3 shows that this is clearly not the case. In contrast, we find considerable
variation in the predicted grant probabilities solely due to different judges serving on
panels. Overall, this heterogeneity in adjudication results in an inconsistency rate of 6.3%
(95% CI 4.6–8.2%), indicating that more than one in sixteen cases is decided differently
than how it would be if the court’s consensus were consistently applied. Column 3 in
Table 3 shows that inconsistency rates are virtually identical for the chair and median
models.
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C Does the Court Become More Consistent Over Time?
Two related questions that emerge from the substantial preference variation reported in
the previous section concern the possible convergence of these preferences over time: is
the inconsistency rate observed in 2007 merely an artefact of the first year of the court’s
existence and do judges’ preferences converge over subsequent years? Or is it a rather
permanent feature of a politicized court whose judges are affiliated with political parties
and voted into office by the parliament?
In order to answer these questions, we now turn to the analysis of all asylum appeal
decisions between 2007 and 2015. As discussed above, on January 1, 2008, the court
introduced the simplified procedure that allows the chair judge to avoid three-judge panels
for appeals that she deems, with the approval of the second judge, ‘clearly with or without
merit’. Among other things, this means that we do not observe the identity of the third
judge for this selective subset of cases over the entire study period.23 Methodologically,
the missing data on the potential third judge is an issue if the chair’s classification of cases
clearly with(out) merit also depends on the preferences of the third judge. For example,
a restrictive judge might be more likely to rule that an appeal is clearly without merit if
the third judge is lenient, and thereby avoid the more complex procedure of determining
the case’s merits in a full panel, and running the risk of having to grant it against her
preferences.
While we cannot directly test the hypothesis that judges’ propensity to invoke the
simplified procedure depends on the second and (unobserved to us) third judge, we can
show that they disagree about what constitutes a case that is clearly with(out) merit.
Appendix Figure F.4 shows the Bayesian estimates from regressing the binary decision to
invoke the ordinary procedure (as opposed to a shorter procedure) on judge and country
of origin fixed effects using all cases decided between 2008 and 2015. We not only find
considerable variation across judges in the likelihood of invoking the ordinary procedure,
23We do observe the potential third judge even for cases decided under the simplified
and single-judge procedure for cases submitted after 2011, when the FAC implemented
a software update that saves the initial assignment of all three judges, independent of
whether or not they were involved in deciding the case.
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ranging between 58 percent (95% CI 36–79) and 8 percent (95% CI 6–11), but also see
that this decision is strongly correlated with party membership in the expected direction
(i.e., more conservative judges are less likely to invoke the ordinary procedure).
Thus, we see two principled ways to deal with those cases for which the simplified
procedure is used. Our preferred option is to impute the missing third judge with the
court’s average preference (computed without the preferences of the chair and second
judge serving on the particular case) and then apply the mixture model. The imputed
average is a consistent estimator of the preference of the unobserved third judge and will
therefore not bias the estimates for the other judges.24 An alternative option is to focus
on the second best-fitting chair model, for which the identity of the third (and second)
judge is by definition not relevant. Appendix Figure F.5 shows that the evolution of the
court’s preference and inconsistency estimated from the chair model is very similar to
estimates from the mixture model with imputation.
Another caveat concerns the comparison of dynamic preferences over time. While the
random assignment of judges to panels allows us to attribute differences in grant rates to
differences in judges’ ideology at any given point in time, it does not allow us to causally
attribute changes in grant rates of the same judge over time to changes in his or her
ideology, since we cannot rule out that the average merit of asylum appeals also varies.
We expect that controlling for country of origin adjusts for most, but probably not all,
of the unobserved variation in case strength across years. Without further and strong
assumptions about constancy of case merits (conditional on country of origin), we cannot
make absolute comparisons of judges’ preferences across years. In effect, this means that
we are not able to distinguish the hypothesis that cases become systematically easier
24We expect, however, that this imputation procedure will somewhat underestimate the
weight of the median model (relative to the chair model), since the preferences of the
actual third judge will typically be farther away from the median than the imputed
mean suggests. Consistent with the preceding analysis of judges’ propensity to invoke
the ordinary procedure, our sample also includes single judge decisions that are solely
decided by the chair judge without involving a second or third judge. Thus, we analyze
those cases with the chair model.
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(harder) to decide consistently from the hypothesis that the judges converge (diverge) in
their behavior. Nonetheless, our flexible model specification, where the preferences of the
judges, and the distributions of cases from each country, vary from year to year enables
us to determine, without invoking any further assumptions, whether overall consistency
improved or worsened over time.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the evolution of judges’ preferences estimated from
the mixture model from 2007 to 2015. The dashed lines show the preferred grant rate of
the individual judges, and the solid lines show the mean grant rate, grouped by parties.
While there is some variation in preferences from year to year, the overall pattern is very
clear: the substantial variance of judges’ preferred grant rates, and the correlation with
party affiliation, remains fairly constant over time.
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Note: Top panel: Year-by-year preference estimates for all judges serving on the court
between 2007 and 2015, with party mean trajectories. Judges’ preferences are estimated
based on all cases decided in a given year. Party names: Conservative Democrats (BDP);
Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); Green Liberal Party (GLP);
Green Party (GPS); non-partisan (Indep); Social Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party
(SVP). Bottom panel: Evolution of inconsistency rate (dark grey line) and corresponding
95% credible intervals (light gray) estimated from the same data. All estimates are based
on the mixture model.
Next, we explore the evolution of the inconsistency rate more explicitly. The bottom
panel of Figure 4 shows the year-to-year inconsistency rate estimated from the mixture
model for 2007-2015. While there is considerable fluctuation in the inconsistency rate
across years, ranging between 3.0 and 6.4 percent, the narrow credible intervals show that
it is always significantly larger than zero. When tracing the evolution of the inconsistency
rate over the study period, we find no evidence that judges’ preferences converged over
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time. In sum, these findings suggest that preference variation in asylum adjudication on
the FAC is by no means confined to the early years of the court’s existence, but rather a
persistent feature. The following conclusion explores the legal and political implications
of this finding.
VI Conclusion
Several studies of asylum adjudication show considerable variation between decision mak-
ers (see, e.g., Fischman 2011; Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag 2007; Rehaag 2007).
A common limitation faced by existing studies is that researchers often only have access
to anonymized information about the identity of the decision maker, which renders corre-
lating estimated preferences with decision maker characteristics such as political ideology
impossible. We overcome this challenge by focusing on asylum appeal decisions of the
Swiss FAC, where judges’ identity and ideology, proxied by party affiliation, is public
knowledge. A second limitation of existing studies is their almost exclusive focus on com-
mon law courts, where judges’ individual opinions are disclosed. In contrast, in many civil
law courts, only the verdict of the entire panel is published. To date, this has made it
impossible to estimate individual preferences of judges serving in those courts. We tackle
this second challenge by developing a methodology that allows us to test different models
of preference aggregation and infer individual preferences from repeated group decisions.
Our analysis of the universe of asylum appeals decided between 2007 and 2015 by the
FAC demonstrates that judges’ preferences vary substantially with regard to grant rates.
Furthermore, judges’ preferred grant rates correlate strongly with their political ideology
in expected ways. Since cases are, conditional on appellants’ origin country, randomly
assigned to judges, the disparities between judges cannot be explained by differences in
case merits. Overall, this leads to substantial inconsistency in the court’s decision making,
and we find no evidence that the resulting arbitrariness in adjudication is confined to the
early years of the court. These persistent disparities violate Aristotle’s maxim that ‘like
cases be treated alike’ and the very essence of article 8(1) of the Swiss Constitution, which
stipulates that “every person is equal before the law.”
Our findings have important implications for several audiences. For the comparative
literature on disparities in asylum adjudication, our paper provides some of the most
direct evidence to date that judges’ political ideology influences their preferences over
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asylum appeals, even in the context of a high-stakes appeal court of last resort. While
there is considerable within-party variation, the disparity between the preferred grant
rate of judges affiliated with the most left-wing and the most right-wing parties are both
statistically significant and substantially relevant. The resulting inconsistency rate is,
however, smaller than what has been found in previous studies in the U.S. and Canada
(see Fischman 2011; Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag 2007; Rehaag 2007).
Our study also has direct policy implications for the Swiss FAC. Our background re-
search and meetings with members of the court revealed that the court is aware of, and
concerned by, allegations of disparities in adjudication that we quantitatively confirm
here. The FAC has two institutional features that are designed to increase consistency
in decision making. First, when new legal questions arise or the situation in a country
of origin changes, five-judge panels issue leading decisions that have stare decisis-like
implications for subsequent decisions on similar appeals. Second, judges from different
chambers are assigned to serve together on panels in non-urgent cases to facilitate ex-
change and consistency. While our analysis cannot speak to the success or failure of these
measures, the overall trend gives little reason for optimism: When exploring the evolution
of disparities in appeal decision over the study period, we find little evidence that the
court converged in more recent years.
If the goal is to minimize the variation in grant rates within the current partisan
selection procedure, the FAC would have to look at the design of the decision-making
procedure. Abolishing the simplified procedure would likely have only minor effects on the
overall inconsistency (while significantly increasing the workload), since the structure of
the ordinary decision-making procedure also grants considerable power to the chair judge.
Based on the findings of this study, we believe that panels are only able to effectively
moderate inconsistency if all three judges have to simultaneously review the appeal and
independently draft a verdict. While more work than under the existing procedure,
only such a redesigned decision-making process promises to unleash the full power of
Condorcet’s jury theorem (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Lorenz et al. 2011).
Lastly, our study also has broad methodological implications for scholars concerned
with inferring individual preferences from group decisions. We show that in a context
where decision makers are repeatedly and randomly allocated to groups, our methodol-
ogy can recover the aggregation rule (or mixture of aggregation rules) that best fits the
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decision-making process, and the individual preferences, from group decisions—without
observing individual votes. We expect that this methodology can also be fruitfully ap-
plied in a variety of other contexts of repeated group interactions, where joint decisions or
performance indicators without any information on individual votes or contributions are
the norm. Beyond judicial behavior, particularly promising examples for future applica-
tions are, for example, the estimation of preferences of MPs who are repeatedly allocated
to serve on various committees, or the abilities of students working on group projects
with rotating group membership. We hope that sharing the code that implements the
estimator proposed in this study (add dataverse doi upon acceptance) facilitates the
adoption of this methodology in political science and neighbouring disciplines concerned
with decision making and preference aggregation of groups with varied interests.
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Figure F.1: Party Aggregates of MPs’ Preferences on Asylum Issues



























Note: Figure displays item-response theory (IRT) estimates of parties’ ideal points from
pro- vs. anti-asylum roll call votes cast by MPs in the National Council over the study
period, 2007–2015.
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Note: Estimated preferences of judges from chair model that controls for origin coun-
try and uses hierarchical priors on judges, setting the country of origin effect to its
average value. Sample consists of all three-judge panel decisions on cases submitted in
2007. Posterior means and 95% credible intervals. Parties are abbreviated as follows:
Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); non-partisan (Indep); Social
Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
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Note: Estimated preferences of judges from median model that controls for origin coun-
try and uses hierarchical priors on judges, setting the country of origin effect to its
average value. Sample consists of all three-judge panel decisions on cases submitted in
2007. Posterior means and 95% credible intervals. Parties are abbreviated as follows:
Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); non-partisan (Indep); Social
Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
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Note: The graph displays the probability that a chair judge invokes the ordinary pro-
cedure, as opposed to the simplified (for cases clearly with(out) merit) or single-judge
procedure (without entering into the substance of the case). Point estimates and corre-
sponding confidence intervals are Bayesian estimates from regressing the binary decision
to invoke the ordinary procedure (as opposed to one of the shorter procedures) on chair
judge and country of origin fixed effects using all cases decided between 2008 and 2015.
Party names: Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); Green Liberal
Party (GLP); Green Party (GPS); non-partisan (Indep); Social Democrats (SP); Swiss
People’s Party (SVP).
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Note: Top panel: Year-by-year preference estimates for all judges serving on the court
between 2007 and 2015, with party mean trajectories. Judges’ preferences are estimated
based on all cases decided in a given year. Party names: Conservative Democrats (BDP);
Christian Democrats (CVP); Free Democratic Party (FDP); Green Liberal Party (GLP);
Green Party (GPS); non-partisan (Indep); Social Democrats (SP); Swiss People’s Party
(SVP). Bottom panel: Evolution of inconsistency rate (dark grey line) and corresponding
95% credible intervals (light gray) estimated from the same data. All estimates are based
on the chair model.
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Additional Tables

















Note: Grant rate averaged across all
34,926 cases decided between 2007 and
2015 and grouped according to the pro-
cedure invoked (ordinary, simplified, or
single), the language of the case (Ger-
man, French, Italian), and the party af-
filiation of the chair judge.
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Table T.2: Descriptive Statistics for Legal Categories
Legal Category Proportion of Cases
Asylum and return 0.393
Inadmissibility of request 0.349
Asylum request abroad 0.060
Asylum and return (RR) 0.045
Enforcement of return 0.027
Asylum 0.026
Asylum procedure (other) 0.025
Return / enforcement (RR) 0.025
Revocation temporary protection 0.016
Family reunification 0.012
Allocation to canton 0.007
Airport asylum and return 0.006
Revocation of asylum 0.005
Airport entry refusal 0.001
Airport inadmissibility 0.001
Deprivation of refugee status 0.001
Detention review 0.001
Costs 0.001
Note: Table shows the proportion of cases in each legal
category for all categories with at least 0.1% of cases. RR
indicates reconsideration requests (following initial rejec-
tions). The table includes all 34,926 cases decided between
2007 and 2015. Note that the balance tests for 2007 only
include legal categories with at least one case in that year.
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Table T.3: Caseload by Judge











































Note: Table shows the proportion of cases by
chair judge for the 34,926 cases decided be-
tween 2007 and 2015.
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Table T.4: Proportion of Cases by Top-20 Origin Country








Syrian Arab Republic 0.035
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the 0.032
Ethiopia 0.030










Note: Table shows the proportion of cases by appellants’ origin
country (restricted to top 20) for the 34,926 cases decided between
2007 and 2015.
11
Table T.5: Mixture Model: Judges’ Preference Estimates for 2007
Judge Point Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
SP 1 0.338 0.160 0.627
CVP 4 0.261 0.126 0.461
Indep 2 0.231 0.101 0.423
Indep 1 0.204 0.087 0.415
Indep 4 0.200 0.086 0.377
SP 2 0.195 0.079 0.426
SP 4 0.192 0.093 0.338
SP 6 0.186 0.076 0.377
FDP 5 0.167 0.078 0.306
Indep 6 0.158 0.081 0.290
FDP 1 0.136 0.044 0.282
SP 5 0.124 0.035 0.289
Indep 5 0.121 0.030 0.254
CVP 2 0.116 0.047 0.218
SP 7 0.114 0.029 0.248
Indep 7 0.103 0.033 0.191
CVP 5 0.085 0.021 0.184
FDP 2 0.083 0.013 0.197
SVP 3 0.081 0.019 0.180
CVP 3 0.078 0.014 0.208
SP 3 0.073 0.018 0.164
FDP 4 0.068 0.017 0.148
FDP 6 0.060 0.015 0.128
SVP 1 0.055 0.012 0.124
CVP 1 0.055 0.016 0.109
Indep 3 0.053 0.012 0.116
FDP 3 0.053 0.012 0.121
SVP 2 0.044 0.007 0.112
Note: Table displays estimated preferences
of the judges from the best-fitting mixture
model that controls for origin country and
uses hierarchical priors on the judges, set-
ting the country of origin effect to its av-
erage value. Sample consists of all three-
judge panel decisions on cases submitted in
2007. Mixture probability for chair model:
λ1 = .45. Posterior means alongside with
95% credible intervals. Parties are abbrevi-
ated as follows: Christian Democrats (CVP);
Free Democratic Party (FDP); non-partisan
(Indep); Social Democrats (SP); Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party (SVP).
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